BOKO HARAM'S CLAIM TO A 'CALIPHATE': IS IT CREDIBLE?

Fahm, AbdulGafar Olawale*

Abstract: As Boko Haram tries to establish a new caliphate, while imposing Shari'ah law and persecuting and kidnapping young girls, it is timely to enquire into both the workings of the early caliphate and the role an Islamic state should play in the world. The aim of this paper is both to counter Boko Haram's approach to the caliphate and examine the administration of Umar bin Abdul Aziz (715-717CE). The article is qualitative, permitting a descriptive and historical approach. This study examines Umar bin Abdul Aziz as a devoted Muslim who set new standards for what a Muslim ruler should be like. This study suggests that, despite Muslim dreams of a 'return of the caliphate', this concept means different things to different people. While Boko Haram violently struggles for power, Islam encourages sovereignty based on honour and gained through better actions and faith.

Keywords: Caliphate; Boko Haram; Leadership; Umar bin Abdul Aziz; Islamic State

Introduction

There have been a number of studies of the Nigerian group known as Boko Haram, most of which have focused on the group's terrorist acts, especially in Nigeria's north-eastern region. In particular, Boko Haram's activities have been discussed in the context of the state's response to it. In addition, scholars have examined attempts by the group to impose religious ideology through terrorism. The activities of Boko Haram have also been linked to the question of insecurity. But if Boko Haram is fighting to overthrow the Nigerian government and create an Islamic state, as reported in Chothia's *Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?* and Cook's *Boko Haram: A New Islamic State in Nigeria*, the question arises, in what manner should an Islamic state be governed? In other words, is there an Islamic approach to governing a sovereign land?

The name 'Boko Haram' is derived as follows: the word *boko* in the Hausa language means 'book' (mostly in the sense of a Western book) and *haram* is an Arabic loanword meaning 'forbidden'. The group got this name from the local residents of its base at Maiduguri due to its strong disgust of Western education, which it believes is corrupting Muslims. However, the name the group uses to refer to itself is *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah lidda'awah wal Jihad* ('The Group of the People of the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad'). Until 2009, the

group was led by Mohammed Yusuf, who during that year died in the custody of the Nigerian Police Force.⁶

Given the level of atrocities committed by Boko Haram (such as suicide bombings, maimings, and the killing of ordinary citizens), it seems the lengths they will go to in achieving their dastardly aims knows no limit. Nigerians as a whole have been subjected to extraordinary levels of trauma and anxiety due to indiscriminate Boko Haram attacks. One of the major atrocities committed by the group, which shocked the world, was the kidnapping of more than 250 schoolgirls from Chibok. In a video released by the group, their leader Abubakar Shekau announced that he would sell the girls, since he regarded them as war booty. This led to an outcry from the international community, civil society and even social media.

The atrocities committed by the group have had a significantly negative effect on the Nigerian populace. During the peak of its activities, the group killed an estimated 4,000 people, thereby making it one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. Both the United Nations and the Nigerian government have reported that Boko Haram-related violence has affected more than 10.7 million people, 2.4 million of whom are currently displaced, with the vast majority (1.5 million) of the latter being children. Although the group has focused on a wide range of targets, its victims are often impoverished civilians in the Muslim populated north-eastern part of Nigeria.

The central issues examined by this article are the declaration by Boko Haram of an Islamic caliphate in Nigeria and the manner in which the group has gone about their activities. ¹⁰ The caliphate as an institution emerged after the demise of the Prophet Muhammad in 632CE and proved central to Islam and Islamic political thought from the seventh to the twentieth centuries. As both a political and a religious idea, its relevance appears to have waxed and waned according to circumstance. ¹¹ Certainly, the caliphate is one of the most contested of Islamic institutions today, with contemporary debate often revolving around its applicability in modern times. ¹² Of all Islam's caliphs, one of the most significant was Umar bin Abdul Aziz. He is sometimes counted among the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, after Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali, even though he ruled after them. Umar bin Abdul Aziz became Caliph in Safar, 99 AH, and ruled for two years and five months. During his reign, justice was tasted everywhere; he settled all disputes and introduced praiseworthy innovations in administering the Islamic state.

This article looks at Boko Haram's struggle for control in north-eastern Nigeria and juxtaposes its actions with the exemplary leadership displayed by Umar bin Abdul Aziz. Through analytical and historical approaches, the article highlights issues that are pertinent to the development of a modern Islamic state. It also attempts to assess the impact of the Boko Haram insurrection and

what can be gleaned from the lessons of past Muslim rule. Its assessment of the effectiveness of past Muslim rule, especially that of Umar bin Abdul Aziz, will add to the growing literature on the caliphate and the contemporary Islamic state.

Boko Haram and the Struggle for Power

Boko Haram's struggle is directed against the Nigerian government. In achieving its aims, the group uses various means, ranging from suicide bombings to kidnappings. The group has not stated in clear terms what its political plans and programmes are, or how the organisation is structured. Videos emanating from the group often show Abubakar Shekau as leader. Since the group operates under furtive circumstances, the level of its public support and the number of its operatives are difficult to ascertain. However, there are indications that the group receives local and international support in their struggle for power.¹³

Boko Haram have shown cruelty, using propaganda based on violence in their struggle against the Nigerian government. Its use of violence can be seen in its various videos, which capture beheadings and throat-slittings. The group began its operations by attacking the security forces in the country, those people with links to the government, as well as anyone else who actively opposed them. They have since moved on to women and children.

The group's struggle for power reached its peak when it declared Gwoza in Borno state as the capital of their caliphate. In getting to that stage in their melee, they had already murdered Christians and Muslims opposed to their aims. For example, the group killed the emir of Gwoza, Shehu Mustapha Idrissa Timta, on May 30, 2014. As of September 2014, Boko Haram is still able to operate freely in a territory about the size of Rhode Island. School students in particular have faced their brutish attacks, with male students being killed and female students kidnapped for ransom or servitude.

As a result of the group incessantly killing and maiming innocent citizens, it is becoming obvious that their aim is not purely religious, but rather stems from a desire to control and rule the people. Nevertheless, the group's ideology claims to be against the constituted government of the country, tending instead towards the establishment of Islamic order. This is what has transformed the group from a mere proselytizer of the faith into a clandestine network that confronts the authorities, leading to irregular warfare.¹⁷

The radical approach of Boko Haram in its struggle for control is also moulded by its Nigerian setting. The country's history of poor administration, as well as extraordinary destitution in the north, plays into the narrative of the radical group. As a result, the group combines a partisan and sweeping Islamic agenda with violence. Its expressed objective in the struggle for power is the establishment of a Shari'ah-compliant caliphate. However, the group demonstrates little enthusiasm for really administering or actualising economic improvement in the territories it controls.

Reactions to Boko Haram's Control

The battle between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram has led to severe humanitarian crisis. Many individuals have fled their homes, especially in the northern part of Nigeria, with many others being exiled to neighbouring countries. As a result, Boko Haram is seen as a disturbance on the grounds that their insurrection has made life more wearisome. Economic exercises have been destabilised, free movement through the country has been disrupted, and the increased presence of policemen has brought more dishonesty and intimidation. Indeed, where sections of society, specifically parts of the youth, are known to support the campaign or message of Boko Haram, their support is often based on Boko Haram's willingness to attack loathed Nigerian government authorities.

The general public attitude to the group and its message has nevertheless been mostly negative. For instance, when references are made to attacks by the group, it is frequently emphasised how innocent individuals suffer. Many who are directly affected by the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram have expressed a desire to be allowed to carry on with their normal lives rather than be drawn into the unnecessary political-cum-religious gimmicks of the group. It is important to state here that the populace facing attack by the group are still as committed to Islam and Shari'ah as before, with their main concern being the curbing of social vices discouraged by the religion. Even though Boko Haram has brought these issues back onto the political agenda, its manner of dealing with them has led to other problems, including killing fellow Muslims for matters as trivial as playing cards, selling *haram* meat or even drinking in beer parlours. Such outrageous implementation of Islamic Law has estranged numerous Muslims, prompting many Muslim scholars to draw attention to the fact that betting and drinking, albeit illegal in Islam, do not carry capital punishment.

Although it has been noted that Boko Haram has, at times, carried out attacks at certain times and places in order to avoid hitting ordinary citizens, when attacking Christians, the radical group has often killed indiscriminately. Christian places of worship have been attacked during Sunday worship services, when men, women and children have been killed in order to create the greatest impact. As Wole Soyinka, in an article written in reaction to the indiscriminate killings of Boko Haram, notes: "when you get a situation where a bunch of people can go into a place of worship and open fire through the windows, you have reached a certain dismal watershed in the life of the nation."²⁰

Apart from the normal military counter-insurgency, a major step taken by the people in their fight against Boko Haram has been the establishment of paramilitary

groups (popularly called vigilantes groups), which later metamorphosed into the Civilian Joint Task Force. This Task Force has been more effective than the Nigerian military, especially due to the incidences of mutiny, refusal to fight and desertion found among the latter. This means, however, that locals have often had to rely on the vigilantes when fighting Boko Haram. The vigilantes are people drawn from the local population and at times know members of Boko Haram in their districts

Islamic scholars and human rights officials from various parts of the world have also denounced the killings and kidnappings committed by Boko Haram. The leaders of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Council of Muslim Organizations (CMO), for instance, held a joint press conference calling for the immediate release of those kidnapped by Boko Haram. The research institute and human rights committee of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has echoed these denunciations. Not to be left out, religious leaders and officials in Nigeria have sharpened their tone of condemnation. Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, the Emir of Kano, called on Muslims to fight against Boko Haram, saying: "These terrorists slaughter our boys and abduct our girls to force them into slavery...People should not sit idle and say prayer is the only solution. People should be made aware of the importance of being in a state of preparedness and make sure they acquire what they need to protect themselves. We should be ready to give our lives."

A Brief Note on the Life of Umar bin Abdul Aziz

Umar bin Abdul Aziz bin Marwan bin Hakam was born in Hilwan, Egypt, around the year 62 AH, when his father was Governor of Egypt.²³ His mother was Umar bin Khattab's granddaughter – this is, the daughter of Asim bint Umar bin Khattab.²⁴ After he memorised the Qur'an at a young age, his father sent him for further education in Madinah. There he was known to frequent the gatherings of scholars such as Ubaydullah bin Abdullah. It was from the scholars of Madinah that he learned theology, eventually enjoying such a high reputation for his knowledge and virtue that he came to be regarded as being amongst the religious scholars himself. Indeed, many well-known scholars used to live in his company as students.

After the death of his father, Umar bin Abdul Aziz married Fatima, the daughter of Caliph Abdul Malik bin Marwan. When Walid bin Abdul Malik became caliph, he made Umar bin Abdul Aziz the Governor of Madinah. During this period as Governor, many scholars and learned men were known to gather around Umar. His fame rested on his choosing to govern in accordance with the injunctions of Islam.²⁵ He established the council of legal scholars in Madinah and used to attend to the affairs of expeditions in consultation with them. The

people of Iraq, who often felt dissatisfied with the harsh policies of their own Governor, Hajjaj, sought refuge in Umar's domain. When Hajjaj wanted Umar to repatriate them to Iraq without delay, Umar refused to take any action. As a result, Hajjaj complained to Walid bin Abdul Malik and Umar was deposed from his position as Governor of Madinah and asked to stay in Syria.²⁶ It was stated that, when Umar left Madinah in 93AH, he looked back at the city and cried, telling his servant: "I dread that it was Madinah which banished us," meaning that he felt Allah had expelled him from Madinah for his own bad conduct.²⁷

When Walid bin Abdul Malik wanted to revoke the nomination of Sulaiman as his successor in favour of his own son, Umar bin Abdul Aziz vehemently opposed the move, resulting in his emprisonment.²⁸ Remaining in prison for three years, he was finally released based on someone's recommendation. When Sulaiman did finally succeed Walid, he felt obliged to Umar for his sacrifice. He therefore made Umar his chief adviser and nominated him in his will as the next caliph.²⁹

Umar bin Abdul Aziz's Attitude and Contribution towards Islam

Umar was a dedicated Muslim who wanted all other Muslims to also follow the Islamic way of life. He himself set the pattern for such life by living simply and via the example of the Rightly Guided Caliphs.^{30,31} That is why he was called 'Umar the Second' or the 'Fifth Righteous Caliph'.

Umar bin Abdul Aziz became Caliph in the month of Safar 99AH, and remained in power until his death on the 25 Rajab 101AH. He died at Dayr Sim'an in Hims after ruling for two years, five months and four days.³² He was buried on a plot of land bought from a Christian monk at a monastery in the *jund* of Hims.³³ As mentioned, he is regarded as *al-khalifa al-'adil*, an exemplar of Muslim virtue, piety, equity, and humility. He has been accepted as a genuine caliph, unlike the other Umayyads, who some historians only regard as *muluk* (kings).³⁴ Also, it was said that he was an Imam whose method of prayer perfectly reflected that of the Prophet Muhammad. Whenever he led the prayer, he perfected bowing and prostrating before Allah, not spending a long time standing, sitting or kneeling.³⁵ He set new standards of what a Muslim ruler should be like by avoiding show and ostentation. He also enjoined the idea of simplicity and austerity in all matters pertaining to the state.

When Raja bin Haiwa read Sulaiman bin Abdul Malik's will, Umar was heard saying "To Allah do we belong and to Him is our return," a statement often quoted by Muslims when a calamity befalls someone. He was visibly shocked and dismayed with his appointment and said: "I never invoked Allah to make me the Caliph." Upon his appointment, he gathered the people and gave a speech. In giving his speech he praised God and said:

O people! There is no Book after the Qur'an and there is no Prophet after Muhammad. I am not going to initiate anything new but I am supposed to complete (what has been left incomplete). I am not a *mubtadi* (initiator) but a *muttabi* (follower) and I am by no means better than you. Yes, my load is heavier. One who runs away from a tyrannical king, cannot be a tyrant himself, remember obedience to any creature against the divine commandments is not lawful.³⁷

From this quotation it is clear that he understood that the burden of the entire community had been placed upon him. That is why he was known to be very particular in the use of money from the public treasury. He also went to the extent of asking his wife, Fatimah, to surrender all her ornaments to the state treasury, which she willingly did.

Not long after he became Caliph, Umar bin Abdul Aziz issued instructions that the usual practice of reviling Ali bin Abi Talib in the Friday sermons be stopped. He also restored the garden of Fedak to the family of Ali, as well as other properties which had been illegally taken by the previous rulers.³⁸ He also attempted to ease the lot of converts to Islam by decreeing that, upon conversion, a person should no longer be subject to the poll tax. This command led to many people embracing Islam during his reign. This was because he believed that the Prophet was sent to mankind as a mercy and not as a tax gatherer, therefore the discrimination between Muslims should stop. He also went further to state that no Muslim should be allowed to purchase land from a non-Muslim in order to protect the interests of the minorities living within Muslim territories.³⁹

His Exemplary Justice

Umar bin Abdul Aziz showed exemplary understanding of the concept of justice in Islam. He was considered unusual and innovative in his approach to controlling the Muslim empire. When compared to his predecessors and successors, he was more in line with both the spirit and letter of the Qur'an.

His most critical amendment to the practice of previous rulers was to equalise the treatment of non-Arab and Arab Muslims. Prior to his reign, non-Arab troops, for example, were frequently not permitted equal rights with respect to war booty, land, and salary as their Arab colleagues. In wider society, non-Arab Muslims also had different rights with regards to taxes (mentioned above). After Umar, however, no Muslim would be treated differently from another.⁴⁰

Other than enhancing the status of non-Arab Muslims, Umar bin Abdul Aziz sought to build up greater equity between different Arab groups within the caliphate. He also appointed new and capable men to the most important

official positions.⁴¹ In other words, Umar appointed relative unknowns whose sense of responsibility and commitment to his reform programme could be relied upon, thereby modifying the past approach of assigning Syrians or others closely connected with the Umayyad house.

Although Umar bin Abdul Aziz has been accused of favouring Muslims over adherents of other religions, his appointments only sought to enhance the solidarity and devotion of Muslims to their caliphal benefactor. Judging from the policies toward non-Muslims pursued in the following centuries, Umar can be regarded as exalting Islam rather than the superiority of the Arab conqueror. However, the edict ascribed to Umar commanding that all non-Muslims be purged from the administration of the state is intractable. Indeed, a wider range of reading confirms that Umar did indeed take measures which might have adversely affected non-Muslim bureaucrats under the Umayyads. Umar's general approach, it appears, was to put into practice a system which acknowledged the right of anyone who wished to accept Islam to do so, give them the opportunities concomitant with the status of a Muslim, but while also averting a complete collapse in the income of the government.

Overall, it can be said that Umar bin Abdul Aziz was more interested in assisting those who wished to come into the fold of Islam than with effecting the territorial expansion of the Muslim caliphate. Thus, rather than attack the Byzantine emperor Leo III, he extended a kind invitation to embrace Islam. He also restored half of the kingdom of the former crown prince of Sind after his acceptance of Islam. In addition, when Jarrah bin Abdullah, the Governor of Khorasan, wrote to Umar about the roughness and undisciplined nature of the people in Khorasan, Umar responded that straightening them out with the sword was not an option; justice automatically reforms the people, and should therefore be propagated amongst them instead.⁴⁵

Basically, after being chosen as caliph, Umar engaged in activities that would end injustice, oppression, and tyranny, all of which had crept into the Muslim community.

His Policies

Umar bin Abdul Aziz's exposure to the prominent *fuqaha*' and *muhaddithun* of his time greatly influence his policies as caliph. Due to the political and social maladies of his time, Umar embarked on projects entailing social justice and political reform.

For example, during the caliphate of the Banu Umayyads, the most fertile land and villages had been taken by them beyond their dues. As a result, other Muslims were deprived of their rights, with few daring to protest. Umar, however,

seized any properties unjustly taken by his kinsfolk and either returned them to their rightful owners or donated them to the *Baytul-Mal* (public treasury). As the Umayyads lost their undeserved properties, the high status and grandeur they had enjoyed in comparison with other tribes began to change into equality and impartiality.

Not only was Umar very cautious about benefiting from the *Baytul Mal* himself, but he also frequently wrote to his governors, reminding them to also be very careful in this regard. For instance, he deposed Yazid bin Muhallab and had him imprisoned, allegedly for too blatantly feathering his own nest while governor.⁴⁶

Although he chose an ascetic life for himself, Umar paid high salaries to his governors and state officials in order to make it easier for them not to take bribes and engage in other forms of corruption. He encouraged his governors to build forts of justice in their cities and purify the roads by removing oppression from them, instead of concentrating on building mere vainglorious structures.⁴⁷

He was known for his kindness to animals and issued orders protecting their rights. He also introduced business ethics, forbidding his governors and state officials from engaging in business or trade in the areas of their jurisdiction, lest such should lead to injustice and corruption.⁴⁸

His Sense of Responsibility

Umar bin Abdul Aziz's sense of responsibility is evident from various narrations about his virtues and habits. In one narration, he informed his wife about his desire to eat grapes, saying that, if she had some money, she should lend it to him so he could buy some. His wife replied in the negative, saying: "you are the chief of believers and you haven't got enough money to purchase grapes." Umar responded by saying, "it is better to carry away the longing for grapes buried in my heart than eating abrasions of chains in hell tomorrow." In another narration, it was stated that whenever Umar wanted to punish someone, he used to keep them in custody for three days first as a precautionary measure, so that he might not punish them in a state of anger or in haste.

When he reduced the expenditure of his family, members of his family complained. He said to them, "my wealth is not sufficient to continue your previous expenditures. As for the public treasury, you have as much right to it as any other Muslims has." ⁵⁰

Umar also showed a good sense of responsibility when dealing with the Khawarij revolt in Khorasan. He wrote to the Governor of Iraq, Abdul Hamid bin Abdul Rahman, ordering him not to engage the rebels unless they shed blood or cause corruption to spread in land. Even if they did act in that manner, the Governor should only intervene so as to prevent those actions. Meanwhile, Umar

also wrote to the chief of the Khawarij, stating that "I have been informed that you rebelled in anger for the sake of God and His Prophet. But you have no better right to that than I do. Come to me, then, so that I may discuss the matter with you: if we are in the right, you will join (the community) in what the people (believe); but if you are in the right, we will reconsider our position." The chief of the Khawarij wrote back to Umar saying: "You have been fair, and I am therefore sending you two men who will confer and debate with you."⁵¹ This gesture on the part of Umar prevented clashes with the Khawarij during his reign. In fact, the Khawarij decided not to undertake any revolutionary steps against his authority, effectively suspending all their activities during his caliphate. This was because they recognized from his manner and approach towards them his high sense of responsibility to all members of the Muslim community under his domain.

Conclusion

An attempt has been made in the foregoing discussion to evaluate both the declaration of an Islamic caliphate by Boko Haram and the exemplary leadership of Umar bin Abdul Aziz as a Muslim Caliph who, in spite of the short time he served as a Muslim leader, was able to make a significant contribution to the Islamic world.

It has been established that, notwithstanding his brief rule, Umar bin Abdul Aziz was able to set the standard for what a Muslim ruler should be like. He lived a simple life based on the same pattern as the Rightly Guided Caliphs. Under his direction, he restored the status of converts to Islam by decreeing that upon embracing Islam a person should no longer be subject to the poll tax. To the present writers, this was the greatest achievement of Umar. He also stopped the practice of cursing Ali bin Abi Talib during Friday sermons.

Umar, as we have noted, also showed a deep understanding of Islam when carrying out various reforms during his reign. Compared to his predecessors, he was more in line with both the spirit and letter of Islam. In the area of policies, the caliph was very cautious about benefiting from the public treasury and frequently wrote to his governors admonishing them to act likewise and not oppress the people in their domain. Thus, through his example he showed how much he abhorred repression and tyranny.

Finally, the great sense of responsibility displayed by Umar bin Abdul Aziz was one of his most lasting achievements, setting the Islamic caliphate of his day in line with the ideals of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. That is why, during the period of his caliphate, many people embraced Islam enthusiastically. All-in-all, his accomplishments attest to his greatness as a Muslim leader of the classical period. Umar's personality was the embodiment of what Islam is; it can be deduced from his life that, the closer a ruler or group comes to Islam, the greater

the positive response from the people. Therefore, the extreme ruthlessness with which Boko Haram go about their activities cannot help the group in its struggle for power. Rather, a strong feeling of brotherhood, solidarity, and justice would lead to more positive results. This is a more practical and realistic approach, which is why Islam demands a sovereign land be ruled with honour, through better actions and faith.

Based on the above study, the following policy recommendations are offered:

- Any Islamic caliphate system should be based on the exemplary leadership displayed by Umar bin Abdul Aziz.
- Under an Islamic caliphate system all kinds of oppression should be jettisoned. Rather what should be in place is more care and concern for the less priviledged.
- Any leader of an Islamic state should be well grounded in the teachings of Islam in order to reflect the true spirit of the religion.
- The main function of an Islamic state is to show and spread feelings of brotherhood, solidarity and justice wherever Islamic rule is established.

Notes

- * AbdulGafar Olawale Fahm is a native of Nigeria. He received his B.A. in Islamic Studies from the University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He obtained his M.A. and PhD from the International Islamic University Malaysia. His areas of interest are Islamic Spiritual Culture, Contemporary Issues, and Islamic Thought. Dr. Fahm is a Lecturer in the Department of Religions, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. He can be contacted at fahm.ao@unilorin.edu.ng
- See D. E. Agbiboa and B. Maiangwa, 'Nigeria united in grief; divided in response: Religious terrorism, Boko Haram, and the dynamics of state response,' *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 14, no.1 (2014): 63–97; I. Aghedo and O. Osumah, 'The Boko Haram uprising: How should Nigeria respond?' *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 5 (2012): 853–869; H. Solomon, 'Counter-terrorism in Nigeria: responding to Boko Haram,' *The RUSI Journal* 157, no. 4 (2012): 6–11.
- 2. See A. S. Y. Bagaji, M. S. Etila, E. E. Ogbadu and J. G. Sule, 'Boko Haram and the recurring bomb attacks in Nigeria: attempt to impose religious ideology through terrorism?' *Cross-Cultural Communication* 8, no. 1 (2012): 33–41; H. Onapajo and U. O. Uzodike, 'Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria: Man, the state, and the International System,' *African Security Review* 21, no. 3 (2012): 24–39.
- See A. Okpaga, U. S. Chijioke, and O. I. Eme, 'Activities of Boko Haram and insecurity question in Nigeria,' *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review* 1, no. 9 (2012): 77; S. S. Shuaibu, M. A. Salleh and A. Y. Shehu, 'The impact of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigerian national security,' *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences* 5, no. 6 (2015):

- 254-266.
- 4. F. Chothia, 'Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists,' Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501. (Acessed on: 21 August 2017).
- 5. D. Cook, 'Boko Haram: A New Islamic State in Nigeria,' Available at: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Boko+Haram%3A+A+New+Islamic+State+in+Nigeria&btnG=&hl=en&as sdt=0%2C5. (Accessed on: 21 August 2017).
- 6. A. O. Fahm and M. T. Thani, 'Mutual Moderation as a Panacea for Boko Haram Insurrection,' *Voyages: Journal of Religious Studies* 1, no. 1 (2015): 70–81.
- 7. J. Zenn and E. Pearson, 'Women, Gender and the Evolving Tactics of Boko Haram,' *Journal of Terrorism Research* 5, no. 1 (2014): 50-56.
- 8. L. P. Blanchard, 'Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions,' *Current Politics and Economics of Africa* 7 no. 2, (2014): 22-32.
- 9. Agency Report, 'UN Security Council told Boko Haram's humanitarian crisis "overwhelming.' Available at: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/220341-un-security-council-told-boko-harams-humanitarian-crisis-overwhelming.html. (Accessed on 25 January 2017).
- 10. J. Chasmar, 'Boko Haram Leader Declares Islamic Caliphate in Nigeria.' Available at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/24/boko-haram-leader-declares-caliphate-nigeria/ (Accessed on 25 January 2017).
- 11. N. Danforth, 'The Myth of the Caliphate: The Political History of an Idea.' Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-11-19/myth-caliphate. (Accessed on 25/1/2017).
- 12. A. El Moudden, 'The Idea of the Caliphate between Moroccans and Ottomans: Political and Symbolic Stakes in the 16th and 17th century-Maghrib,' *Studia Islamica* 82, no 1 (1995): 103-112.
- 13. J. Campbell, 'U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram' Available at: https://books.google.com.ng/books?id=C1HHBwAAQBAJ. (Accessed on: 17 January 2017).
- 14. N. Marama and W. Mosadomi, 'Boko Haram Attacks three Emirs, Kills One' Available at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/05/boko-haram-attacks-three-emirs-kills-one/. (Accessed on: 19 January 2017).
- 15. J. Campbell, 'U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram,' 47.
- 16. See J. Reilly, 'Boko Haram Kidnap Dozens of Men and Boys in Attack on Nigeria Village in Latest Islamist Outrage' Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2725964/Boko-Haram-kidnap-dozens-men-boys-attack-Nigeria-village-latest-Islamist-outrage.html. (Accessed on 19 January 2017); See also N. Rothman, 'Why Did Kidnapping Girls, but Not Burning Boys Alive, Wake Media Up to Boko Haram?" Available at: http://www.mediaite.com/online/why-did-kidnapping-girls-but-not-burning-boys-alive-wake-media-up-to-boko-haram/. (Accessed on 2 February 2017).
- 17. V. Comolli, 'Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency,' Available at: https://books.google.com.ng/books?id=vYmMCwAAQBAJ. (Accessed on: 2 February 2017).
- 18. J. Harnischfeger, 'Boko Haram and Its Muslim Critics: Observations from Yobe State,' in *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*, ed. M.-A. P. de Montclos (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2014), 33–62.
- 19. Ibid., 40.

- 20. Z. Warner, 'The Sad Rise of Boko Haram,' New African 516, no 2 (2014): 38.
- 21. Sami Aboudi and Tom Heneghan, 'Islamic officials condemn kidnapping of Nigerian schoolgirls' Available at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1105048. (Accessed on: 8 February 2017).
- 22. See 'Emir of Kano calls Nigerians to arms over Boko Haram,' Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30080514 (Accessed on: 8 February 2017).
- 23. A. S. Najeebabadi, Mubarakfuri, Safi al-Rahman, A. R. Abdullah and M. T. Salafi, *The History of Islam* (Riyadh: Darussalam, 2000).
- 24. T. A. A. S. Muhammad and N. K. E. D. A. Al-Yazid, *Biographies of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs* (Dar Al-Manarah, 2001).
- 25. M. Hasan, *History of Islam* (Srinagar: Alfa Offset, 2001).
- 26. Najeebabadi et al., The History of Islam, 34.
- 27. Muhammad and Al-Yazid, Biographies of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, 67.
- 28. Hasan, History of Islam, 49.
- 29. Najeebabadi, et. al., The History of Islam, 77-88.
- 30. Hasan, History of Islam, 57.
- 31. G. R. Hawting, *The First Dynasty of Islam: the Umayyad caliphate AD 661-750* (London: Routledge, 2002).
- 32. Najeebabadi, et al., The History of Islam, 191.
- 33. L. Yarbrough, *Did 'Umar b. "Abd al-"Aziz Issue an Edict Concerning Non-Muslim Officials?* (Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2016).
- 34. M. Levy-Rubin, *Umar II's ghiyar Edict: Between Ideology and Practice* (Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2016).
- 35. Muhammad and Al-Yazid, Biographies of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, 68.
- 36. Ibid.
- 37. Najeebabadi, et al., The History of Islam, 197.
- 38. Hasan, History of Islam, 56.
- 39. Ibid., 25.
- 40. K. Y. Blankinship, *The End of the Jihad State: The Reign of Hisham Ibn'Abd al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).
- 41. J. Wellhausen, *The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1927).
- 42. M. Levy-Rubin, 'Umar II's ghiyar Edict: Between Ideology and Practice,' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- 43. L. Yarbrough, *Did 'Umar b. "Abd al-"Aziz Issue an Edict Concerning Non-Muslim Officials?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- 44. Hawting, The first dynasty of Islam, 59.
- 45. Najeebabadi, et. al., The History of Islam, 99.
- 46. Hawting, The first dynasty of Islam, 44-56.
- 47. Najeebabadi, et al., The History of Islam, 82.
- 48. A. Moolla, *Umar ibn" Abdul'Azîz: A Classic Biography of the Fifth Righteous Khalîfah* (Karachi: Zam Zam Publishers, 2012).
- 49. Najeebabadi, et al., The History of Islam, 204.
- 50. Najeebabadi, et al., The History of Islam, 205.

51. Al-Tabari, *The History of Al-Tabari (Ta'rikh al-rusul wa'1 muluk)*, ed. E. Yar-Shater, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 77-78.